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Understanding the epidemiological dynamics of highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus (HPAIV) in wild birds is crucial for guiding effective surveil-
lance and control measures. The spread of H5 HPAIV has been well
characterized over large geographical and temporal scales. However, infor-
mation about the detailed dynamics and demographics of individual
outbreaks in wild birds is rare and important epidemiological parameters
remain unknown. We present data from a wild population of long-lived
birds (mute swans; Cygnus olor) that has experienced three outbreaks of
related H5 HPAIVs in the past decade, specifically, H5N1 (2007), H5N8
(2016) and H5N6 (2017). Detailed demographic data were available and
intense sampling was conducted before and after the outbreaks; hence the
population is unusually suitable for exploring the natural epidemiology,
evolution and ecology of HPAIV in wild birds. We show that key epidemio-
logical features remain remarkably consistent across multiple outbreaks,
including the timing of virus incursion and outbreak duration, and the pres-
ence of a strong age-structure in morbidity that likely arises from an
equivalent age-structure in immunological responses. The predictability of
these features across a series of outbreaks in a complex natural population
is striking and contributes to our understanding of HPAIV in wild birds.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling infectious disease out-
breaks in humans, animals and plants: approaches and important themes’.
This issue is linked with the subsequent theme issue ‘Modelling infectious
disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: epidemic forecasting
and control’.1. Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) pose a continued and
serious threat to human and animal health. Additionally, the spread of HPAIV
to farmed poultry can result in great economic damage, through reduced pro-
duction, trade restrictions and the direct costs of emergency control measures
such as livestock culling [1]. While wild waterbirds are the main host reservoir
for low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs), most highly pathogenic
strains have in the past been detected primarily within poultry [2] or in humans,
where they occasionally cause serious disease [3]. However, onewidespread and
diverse lineage of HPAIV deviates from this paradigm: viruses belonging to clade
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22.3.4.4 of avian influenza H5 subtype and that descend from
the GsGd lineage (A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996) appear to
transmit efficiently among wild birds [4]. The propensity of
this virus towards circulation in wild birds has been associated
with virus diversification via genome reassortment and with
its unprecedented global spread. Strains of the GsGd lineage
have been detected across North America, Africa, Europe
and Asia [4].
In the context of the emergence and persistence of H5
HPAIV, understanding the epidemiological dynamics of
avian influenza in wild birds is critical to the development
of effective surveillance and control measures that aim to
safeguard the health of livestock and human populations.
Data on HPAIV in wild birds at each outbreak location are
typically limited to the date of confirmed virus detection,
the number of dead birds, and the host species involved.
Compilations of such reports are used to study the
geographical and temporal distributions of detected HPAIV
cases in wild birds over continental or regional scales [5–8].
By contrast, detailed population-level analyses of the epi-
demiology and transmission of HPAIV for individual
outbreaks are rare. Almost no data are available on the
impact of sequential outbreaks or virus incursions into the
same wild bird population, despite the existence of at least
one site where HPAIV has been detected on five different
occasions [9]. The scarcity of individual-level information
for wild bird populations affected by HPAIV means that
key epidemiological parameters that could be used to refine
surveillance and control measures remain unknown.
Understanding the immunological responses to HPAIV in
wild birds is necessary to understand and predict the risk of
the virus becoming enzootic in wild bird populations. In
Europe alone, serological studies suggest that up to a third
of wild birds from some species may have been infected by
HPAIV [8]. However, in most wild populations, it is difficult
to capture the same bird multiple times over long time
periods, making it hard to evaluate the duration of avian
influenza virus (AIV)-specific immune responses, or the
degree to which initial exposure might help to protect against
subsequent infection. Experimental challenge studies in the
laboratory have shown that primary infection of ducks with
some H5 HPAIVs, or with certain LPAIVs, can prevent
virus shedding upon subsequent challenge with H5 HPAIV
(e.g. [10,11]). However, such studies are often limited by
the experimental requirement of a short time period between
primary and secondary infection, making it difficult to assess
the protective effect of previous infections in wild bird popu-
lations, where primary infection may occur years before
secondary exposure. Quantifying the duration over which
wild birds retain antibodies to HPAIV and LPAIV, how
these responses are distributed within a population, and
how they influence susceptibility to subsequent exposure to
H5 HPAIV, are all important for understanding the biological
basis of the infection patterns that we observe worldwide.
Here, we report the detailed ‘micro-epidemiology’ of
recurrent H5 HPAIV outbreaks, which occurred in a single
wild bird population while that population was under longi-
tudinal sampling and observation. This unusual scenario
allowed us to quantify serological responses within the
affected population before and after an HPAIV epidemic.
Our study population comprises a large population of
mute swans (Cygnus olor) that have been naturally infected
by three different HPAIV viruses belonging to two geneticclades (2.2 and 2.3.4.4) over the last decade; H5N1 in
2007/08 [12], H5N8 in 2016/17 and H5N6 in 2017/18. Impor-
tantly, these birds have been the subject of ornithological
study for more than 60 years, and therefore detailed
demographic information is available for the population
and the individual birds within it. The population is therefore
particularly suitable for exploring the natural epidemiology,
evolution and ecology of HPAIV in wild birds at a high
degree of precision and certainty. We show that key epi-
demiological features are consistent and predictable across
multiple outbreaks in a complex natural population and
we discuss the implications of these findings for HPAIV
transmission in wild birds.2. Material and methods
(a) Field site, population and sampling
The Fleet Lagoon (Dorset, United Kingdom, 50.65378N, 2.60288W)
is home to a large population of wild mute swans (Cygnus olor),
centred on the Abbotsbury Swannery. The population size
changes seasonally and between years, but typically ranges
between 600 and 1000 birds. Swans hatched at the site are
tagged with unique ID markers approximately 24 h after hatch-
ing that are replaced with adult rings at approximately four
months of age. Relatively few birds that hatch locally move
away from the Fleet [13]. Every 2 years, all swans present on
the Fleet Lagoon are caught, ringed, weighed, and their year of
hatching and/or sex recorded, where possible. As a consequence,
detailed data about the date of hatching and sex are known for
most swans on the Fleet Lagoon. Individual birds can be ident-
ified by unique IDs that they carry on two different leg rings
(one metal ring, supplied by the British Trust for Ornithology,
and one Darvic ring, which allows long-range visual identifi-
cation). Birds thought to have been in the population at the
time of each outbreak were estimated from census data, accord-
ing to details in the electronic supplementary material. Note that
in this paper, we use the term ‘juveniles’ to refer to birds that are
less than 1 year old, and ‘adults’ to refer to birds that are older.
A total of 519 blood samples were collected from 404 swans
on the Fleet Lagoon during June 2017, July 2017, November 2017,
January 2018 and June 2018 (UK Home Office licence PPL
P516CDFB6). A cloacal swab and an oropharyngeal swab were
also taken from every bird that was blood sampled.
(b) Serological testing
Sera were tested for the presence of antibodies directed at the
AIV nucleoprotein (NP) using the AIV IDEXX Influenza A Ab
ELISA, according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Haemag-
glutination inhibition (HI) assays were conducted for each
sample that tested positive by NP-ELISA using two inactivated
antigens, LPAIV H5N3 (A/Teal/England/7394-2805/06) and
HPAIV H5N8 (A/Turkey/England/052131/16). HI assays
were conducted according to standard methods [14] (further
details are provided in the electronic supplementary material).
(c) Epidemiological surveillance during HPAIV outbreaks
Dead swans found at the Swannery site are reported by staff to
the Animal and Plant Health Agency (UK) (APHA) and may
be subjected to post-mortem and testing for notifiable diseases.
Following detection of HPAIV H5 at the site in December 2007,
December 2016 and December 2017, oropharyngeal and cloacal
swabs were collected from all dead birds of any species, where
possible, and processed at APHA (further details of site surveil-
lance across outbreak years are provided in the electronic
supplementary material).
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3Not all birds that died during the H5N8 outbreak could be
tested for AIV. The epidemiological analyses for the H5N8 out-
break undertaken here (see below) therefore assume that
untested dead birds found during the H5N8 outbreak were
HPAIV-positive (see electronic supplementary material, figure
S1 for details of which birds were tested). The typical age-adjusted
mortality rate of birds in the same weeks during non-epidemic
years is dramatically lower (approx. 12 recorded deaths per
1000 birds; data averaged between 2009 and 2015) than the mor-
tality rate observed during the peak of the H5N8 epidemic
(approx. 143 deaths per 1000 birds; based on contemporary popu-
lation size). Thus, we can reasonably assume that almost all of the
untested birds at the time of the H5N8 outbreak died of HPAIV.
(d) Viral RNA detection and sequencing
Individual cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs were tested for the
presence of AIV at APHA. RNA was extracted using QIAamp
Viral RNA mini kits and samples were tested for the presence
of AIV RNA using previously published reverse transcriptase
quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) protocols [15–17] (see electronic
supplementary material for details).
H5N8-positive samples from January 2017 were reverse tran-
scribed, amplified using a multiplex PCR method and sequenced
using the Oxford Nanopore Technologies MinION device, fol-
lowing an adaptation of previous methods [18]. H5N6-positive
samples from January 2018 were sequenced on an Illumina
MiSeq using a non-specific metagenomic approach (see elec-
tronic supplementary material for more details of sequencing
approaches).
(e) Phylogenetic analysis
A dataset of Eurasian H5 strains with collection dates in or after
2013 was downloaded from GISAID (www.gisaid.org) and used
for phylogenetic reconstruction (see electronic supplementary
material for dataset details). Alignments for each segment were
completed using the version of MUSCLE implemented in
Geneious 8.1.7.
Molecular clock phylogenies were estimated for the AIV HA
gene using the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
approach implemented in BEAST [19–21]. Appropriate temporal
signal for molecular clock analysis was confirmed using TempEst
[22]. Two independent MCMC runs of 150 000 000 steps were
computed under a strict molecular clock model, an SRD06
nucleotide substitution model, and a constant population size
coalescent prior. Trees were sampled every 20 000 steps, with
the first 10% discarded as burn-in. Convergence of the MCMC
runs were checked using Tracer [23] and maximum clade
credibility trees were computed using TreeAnnotator [24].
For the other seven segments, a preliminary phylogenetic tree
was estimated using neighbour-joining, with Jukes–Cantor genetic
distances. If several genetically distinct large clades were observed
(typically representing reassorted internal genes), then the clade
that contained the sequences from this study was extracted.
These extracted sequences were then used to estimate maximum-
likelihood (ML) phylogenies using PhyML [25], including 100
ML bootstrap replicates to evaluate statistical support. An appro-
priate substitution model for each ML phylogeny was chosen
using the BIC approach implemented in jModelTest [26].
( f ) Epidemiological analyses
Basic reproduction numbers (R0) for the H5N8 and H5N6 out-
breaks were estimated using the R package R0 [27]. R0 was not
estimated for the H5N1 outbreak because very few cases were
observed during that outbreak. Numbers of observed swan car-
casses were used as a proxy for HPAI case counts. A distribution
was specified for the epidemic generation time, obtained fromlaboratory studies that observed the time between experimental
inoculation of geese or ducks with H5N8 and the time to
subsequent infection of contact birds [28–32].
The majority of deaths occurred in juvenile birds (less than 1
year old). We tested for possible effects of the last known weight
or exact age on the probability of death of juvenile birds. Exact
hatch dates are known for almost all birds born into the popu-
lation, and all juveniles are weighed in September or October
of their hatch year. For all ringed juveniles, exact age (in days)
was calculated for the day on which they were weighed, and a
generalized linear model was fitted to calculate the expected
weight of a bird of that age and sex. The difference between
the weight of the bird at ringing and its expected weight was cal-
culated. A generalized linear model was constructed to test
whether the probability of a bird dying was affected by its
age at outbreak start and/or how relatively underweight or
overweight the bird was at last weighing.
The case fatality rate (the proportion of individuals that died
among all individuals that were infected) was crudely estimated
for juvenile birds in both outbreaks. Estimates were not calcu-
lated for adult birds because the protective effect of primary
exposure to H5N8 upon subsequent exposure with H5N6
would prevent direct comparisons of viral virulence. The
number of juvenile birds that had been infected was estimated
by summing the number of birds that died during the outbreak
and the number of birds that were serologically positive for AIV
by HI assay (for H5N8) or ELISA (for H5N6) after the outbreak.
As no blood samples were collected prior to the H5N8 outbreak,
we assume that juvenile birds were seronegative for H5N8 prior
to the outbreak and that the presence of an H5N8 response there-
fore represents seroconversion following infection. Using NP-
ELISA seropositivity as a proxy for seroconversion due to
HPAI H5N6 infection appears appropriate because almost all
juvenile birds were found to be seronegative by this method
before the outbreak. However, we stress that these assumptions
make our estimates of the case fatality rate relatively crude. Dis-
tributions of the mortality rate among infected individuals were
estimated in order to accommodate the effects of sampling and to
allow for some uncertainty in the exact number of juvenile birds
present in the population in December of each year (electronic
supplementary material, figure S2).3. Results
(a) Comparative epidemiology of the H5N8 2016/17
and H5N6 2017/18 outbreaks
The three outbreaks of H5 HPAIV at the Fleet Lagoon were
strikingly similar in their duration and timing within the
calendar year (figure 1a). The first cases of each outbreak
were detected on 27 December 2007 for H5N1, 23 December
2016 for H5N8 and 31 December 2017 for H5N6. The time
between the first and last confirmed positive cases in swans
at the site (hereafter referred to as the outbreak period) was
33 days for H5N1, 32 days for H5N8 and 31 days for H5N6.
During each of the outbreaks, several swans were
observed to be compulsively spinning on the water. This
symptom has been observed only rarely at the site outside
of the HPAIV outbreaks. Multiple birds, including one bird
that was found to be positive for H5N6, were observed to
be lethargic or to have very poor coordination. In the
months following all three outbreaks, unusually high num-
bers of swans with severe torticollis (abnormally twisted
necks) were observed.
Crude mortality in the swan population was three times
higher for the H5N8 2016/17 outbreak than for the H5N6
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Figure 1. Mortality among swans on the Fleet Lagoon. (a) Mortality among swans greater than approximately four months old on the Fleet Lagoon during H5N1
(2007/08), H5N8 (2016/17) and H5N6 (2017/18). Brightly coloured bars indicate the number of dead swans observed during HPAIV ‘outbreak periods’ on the Fleet
Lagoon (period between the first and last confirmed positive cases in swans at the site for each HPAIV subtype). Brightly coloured bars include all mortality observed
during the outbreak period, regardless of whether the carcasses were tested for AIV or AIV positivity. Pale-coloured bars indicate the mortality observed among birds
on the Fleet Lagoon in periods when HPAIV was not detected, and therefore indicate the typical level of mortality observed among swans on the Fleet Lagoon.
While the last HPAIV H5N1-positive swan was found in the vicinity of the Fleet Lagoon during week 4 of 2008, a Canada goose (Branta canadensis) was found
positive for HPAIV less than 1 km from the Fleet Lagoon during week 7 of 2008 and is marked with an asterisk. Dots and horizontal lines indicate the median and
95% HPD interval dates for the MRCA of the Fleet Lagoon outbreak clade, as estimated using phylodynamic methods. (b) Estimated proportion of birds of each age
group that died of HPAIV infection during each outbreak, based on birds believed to be alive in the population at the time each outbreak started. Colours indicate
the respective outbreaks. Adjusted Wald 95% confidence intervals are given.
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42017/18 outbreak (figure 1a). For the H5N6 epidemic, 61
swans died during the outbreak period, of which 51 were
confirmed by RT-qPCR to be AIV-positive and six confirmed
to be AIV-negative. The four remaining birds were not tested,
typically because carcasses were incomplete (electronic sup-
plementary material, figure S1). For the H5N8 epidemic,
182 swans died during the outbreak period, of which 18
were confirmed to be AIV-positive and nine AIV-negative.
Most of the remaining birds could not be tested because,
owing to the scale of the outbreak, it became necessary to dis-
pose of bird carcasses before testing could be conducted. The
lower ratio of AIV-positive-to-negative birds in the H5N8 out-
break compared with the H5N6 outbreak is likely because
AIV testing took place only at the start and end of the
former (electronic supplementary material, figure S1); if test-
ing had occurred during the peak of mortality then a higher
proportion of total deaths would have been attributable to
AIV. Age-adjusted mortality per 1000 birds during the
H5N8 outbreak (¼143) was more than double that estimated
for the H5N6 outbreak (¼65), and more than four times that
of H5N1 (¼32).
The basic reproductive number (R0) was estimated for the
H5N8 and H5N6 epidemics from time series of the number
of recovered carcasses at the site and an estimated epidemic
generation time distribution; the latter was obtained from
published experimental data for H5N8 viruses. The best-
fitting distribution for this parameter was a Weibull
distribution with a mean generation time of 2.9 days and a
standard deviation of 1. The estimated R0 values of the two epi-
demics were similar, although the estimate for the H5N6 2017/
18 outbreak (R0 ¼ 2.69; 95% confidence interval¼ 1.40–5.5)was considerably more uncertain than that of the H5N8
2016/17 outbreak (R0 ¼ 2.25; 95% confidence interval ¼ 1.92–
2.68). The greater uncertainty in the estimate of R0 for H5N6
2017/18 likely results from the smaller number of cases
observed in this outbreak.(b) Molecular clock phylogenetic analysis
Complete or partial virus genome sequences were generated
for 12 samples collected during the H5N8 2016/17 outbreak,
and for three samples collected during the H5N6 2017/18
outbreak. Preliminary ML phylogenetic trees estimated for
each segment showed that, for H5N8, all samples from the
Fleet Lagoon formed a single, well-supported clade, consist-
ent with a single introduction to the site. For H5N6, all
sequences from the Fleet Lagoon clustered together, but
monophyly of this grouping was less robust. Molecular
clock HA phylogenies were subsequently estimated
(figure 2) in order to estimate the date of introduction of
each outbreak lineage into the birds on the Fleet Lagoon.
For each outbreak, marginal posterior estimates of the date
of the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of the outbreak
clade were obtained from the HA alignment. The median
estimated date of the MRCA of the H5N8 outbreak clade
was 25 November 2016 (95% highest posterior density cred-
ible interval (HPD) ¼ 22 October–21 December 2016). For
H5N6, the median date of the MRCA of the outbreak clade
was 17 November 2017 (95% HPD interval ¼ 1 October–
26 December 2017). These dates are strikingly similar to
each other, and to the dates previously reported for the
H5N1 outbreak on the Fleet Lagoon (median date ¼ third
(a) (b)
(c)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
year
–
Figure 2. Bayesian phylogenetic trees of HA sequences. (a) Bayesian time-scaled phylogenetic tree of the HA segment of 421 Eurasian H5 HPAIVs. Colours at tips
indicate the location of sampling (Asia: red, Europe (including Russia): dark blue, Fleet Lagoon: bright blue). (b) Expansion of the well-supported clade that contains
the H5N8 viruses sampled on the Fleet Lagoon (bright blue). The location of this clade within the larger phylogeny is indicated by the linked vertical grey line in (a).
Nodes with posterior support values greater than 0.5 or greater than 0.75 are marked with white and black circles, respectively. (c) As for (b), but showing the
phylogenetic position of the H5N6 viruses from the Fleet Lagoon.
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5week of November 2007, 95% HPD interval ¼middle of
October to end of December 2007 [12]). In all three outbreaks,
the median date of the MRCA precedes the first observed
case and the increase in mortality on the Fleet Lagoon by
approximately one month (figure 1a).
Based on the estimated molecular clock phylogeny of the
HA segment, the H5N8 viruses from the Fleet Lagoon fall
within a well-supported clade with viruses that are primarily
from Europe (figure 2a,b). However, branch order within this
clade is poorly resolved owing to the high genetic similarity
of the outbreak sequences. The divergence date of the H5N8
outbreak clade with the most closely related non-outbreak
viruses is estimated to be nearly 1 year prior to the MRCA
of the H5N8 outbreak on the Fleet Lagoon. We therefore
cannot identify a likely source location for the H5N8 virus
that was introduced to the Fleet Lagoon. By contrast, the
H5N6 outbreak sequences are placed within a clade of con-
temporary viruses from The Netherlands (figure 2a,c).
Although we cannot rule out that possibility that the H5N6
outbreak strain originated from an unsampled location, the
spatio-temporal proximity and genetic similarity of the UK
and The Netherlands strains means that it is plausible that
the H5N6 outbreak was introduced to the UK by migrating
birds from The Netherlands.
The single H5N6 virus that was sequenced from a mute
swan on the Fleet Lagoon is placed as an outgroup to viruses
sampled from a pochard duck (Aythya ferina) and a Canadagoose (Branta canadensis) that were also HPAIV-positive at
the Fleet Lagoon. The mute swan was known to be resident
at the Fleet Lagoon. Given that infections in the mute
swans were likely acquired locally, and the MRCA of the
pochard and goose sequences is more recent than that of
the swan, the pochard and goose may also have been infected
locally.(c) Age distribution of mortality
A consistent pattern of age-structured mortality was
observed in all three H5 HPAIV epidemics that occurred on
the Fleet Lagoon: juvenile birds were more likely to die
than any other age group during each of the H5N1, H5N8
and H5N6 outbreaks (figure 1b). The greatest mortality in
juvenile birds occurred during the H5N8 outbreak, when
36% of juvenile birds died. We tested the significance of the
difference in mortality between juvenile (less than 1 year)
and older birds for each outbreak using two-sided Fisher’s
exact tests. Juvenile birds died 16.8 times more frequently
than birds of all other ages during the H5N1 outbreak (95%
confidence interval of odds ratio ¼ 3.5–106.9; p-value less
than 0.001). Juvenile birds died 10.2 times more frequently
than birds of other ages during the H5N8 outbreak (95% con-
fidence interval of odds ratio ¼ 6.5–16.2; p-value less than
0.0001) and 71.0 times more frequently than birds of other
ages during the H5N6 outbreak (95% confidence interval
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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6of odds ratio ¼ 18.2–609.9; p-value less than 0.0001). By
contrast, during the same winter period of previous non-
epidemic years (2009–2015), juvenile birds were not
significantly more likely to die than adult birds (odds
ratio 1.6; 95% confidence interval of odds ratio¼ 0.9–3.1;
p-value greater than 0.05) (electronic supplementary material,
table S1).
(d) Investigating the effect of age and weight on
chance of death in juveniles
At the start of the H5N8 and H5N6 outbreaks (December
2016 and 2017), juvenile birds varied between 186 and 226
days old and 203 and 239 days old, respectively. Their last
known weights, measured in September and October of
their respective year of hatching, varied between 4.0 and
12.2 kg. Generalized linear models were constructed to test
whether juvenile birds that died during the H5N8 and
H5N6 outbreaks had, on average, different ages or weights
from juvenile birds that survived. When analysing the out-
breaks both together and separately, there was a trend
towards older juveniles and those that were below average
weight upon ringing being more likely to survive the out-
break, but neither difference was significant (p-value greater
than 0.05) (electronic supplementary material, figure S3).
(e) Serological responses
In order to investigate why mortality was significantly
higher in juveniles than in older birds during the three
HPAIV outbreaks, we conducted serological assays on
blood collected from swans in our study population at
multiple times during 2017–2018. Throughout the year, the
prevalence of antibody reactivity to AIV NP in swans greater
than or equal to 2 years of age was greater than 90%
(figure 3a, green and black). By contrast, juveniles that
hatched in spring 2017 and which were tested at approxi-
mately five months of age in November 2017, had a
prevalence of antibody reactivity of only 14% (figure 3a,
blue). When this cohort (i.e. birds hatched in 2017) was
tested again in early 2018, following the H5N6 outbreak,
prevalence of antibody reactivity in juveniles had risen to
61% (figure 3a, blue).
HI assays were conducted on sera collected during June,
July and November 2017 that tested positive for the presence
of antibodies against AIV NP. Most birds that were alive at
the time of the H5N8 outbreak (hatch year ¼ 2016 or earlier)
were seropositive for H5N8 (figure 3b). Among this group,
birds that had hatched in spring/summer 2016 (and were
therefore less than 1 year old when the H5N8 outbreak
occurred in late 2016) were significantly less likely to be sero-
positive for LPAIV H5N3. None of the birds that hatched
after the H5N8 outbreak (hatch year ¼ 2017) exhibited any
evidence of serological exposure to H5 AIV when tested in
November 2017.
( f ) Association of serological responses with mortality
during H5N6 2017/18
For the first time to our knowledge, we were able to explore
whether the serostatus of wild birds tested prior to the H5N6
outbreak correlated with their likelihood of dying during that
outbreak. Four of the 21 birds that died of H5N6 viralinfection during winter 2017/18, and for which earlier
blood samples were available, showed serological evidence
of previous exposure to AIV by NP-ELISA. None of the 21
birds that died showed evidence of previous exposure to an
H5 virus (titres less than 16), suggesting that these AIV sero-
positive birds had been exposed only to non-H5 viruses
(electronic supplementary material, tables S2 and S3). While
this does not exclude the possibility that previous exposure
to specific non-H5 AIV might be protective against death
from H5 HPAIV infection, it does suggest that previous
exposure to H5, particularly to related strains, may be
protective, and that not all LPAIVs are protective.
(g) Seroconversion in individual birds and antibody
duration
Blood was sampled from 59 swans on more than one
occasion from June 2017 to June 2018. Of these, 11 birds sero-
converted to be seropositive for antibodies targeting AIV NP
(electronic supplementary material, figure S4). Only one bird
showed evidence of the opposite trend (sero-reversion).
Twelve birds were tested on two separate occasions (June/
July and November 2017) for the presence of H5-specific anti-
bodies using HI assays. Nine of the 12 birds had HI titres that
remained stable or changed only twofold over this period.
Only two of the 12 birds exhibited a reduction in titre of at
least fourfold for HPAI H5N8 (electronic supplementary
material, figure S5). Therefore, antibody responses to H5N8
HPAIV in many members of this population appear to be
present for at least 11 months after primary infection.
(h) Estimation of mortality rate among infected
juvenile birds
A total of 64 live swans were swabbed during the peak of the
H5N6 outbreak in 2017/18 (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1). Of these, six had cloacal and/or orophar-
yngeal swabs that were positive for HPAI H5N6, with
RT-qPCR cycle threshold (Ct) values less than 37 (five
hatched in 2017 and one hatched in 2014). In total, approxi-
mately 19% (5 out of 26) of live juvenile birds that were
swabbed during the H5N6 outbreak tested positive for the
virus, whereas only approximately 3% (1 out of 37) of live
adult birds were positive. However, this difference was not
statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test; odds ratio ¼ 8.3;
p ¼ 0.07). Two of the juvenile birds that were swabbed
when alive and that tested positive for H5N6 during the out-
break subsequently died, at 3 and 11 days after swabbing.
Both were confirmed to be positive for H5N6 HPAIV at
death. A bird that hatched in 2014 and one of the birds that
hatched in 2017 were sighted in early summer 2018, so
both clearly survived infection.
Three times fewer birds died during the H5N6 outbreak
than the H5N8 outbreak, and this reduction in mortality
was observed in both juvenile and adult birds. Assuming
that juvenile birds in each year were similarly immunologi-
cally naive, the reduction in deaths in juvenile birds could
theoretically have occurred because fewer juveniles overall
were infected, and/or because H5N6 was lower in virulence
than H5N8. To determine whether H5N6 was less virulent in
this population than H5N8, we estimated the case fatality
ratio among juvenile birds for both outbreaks. Under several
assumptions (detailed in Material and Methods), we estimate
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Figure 3. Seropositivity of swans. (a) Percentage of swans with antibodies targeting AIV NP by year of hatching and date of sampling. Colours represent birds
hatched in different years. Adjusted Wald 95% confidence intervals are given. The date of the HPAI H5N6 outbreak is marked. (b) Percentage of swans with titres
greater than 8 for HPAIV H5N8 (A/Turkey/England/16) (blue) and LPAIV H5N3 (A/Teal/England/06) (orange). Birds that were sampled on more than one occasion
have been removed. If a bird was found to be seronegative for previous AIV exposure by NP-ELISA, it is included here as having a titre less than or equal to 8,
despite HI assays not being conducted for that sample. Samples were collected during June, July and November 2017, but birds are grouped by hatch year only as
no seasonal trend in change in titre was observed in these data.
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7that mortality rates among infected juvenile birds may have
been approximately 46% for HPAIV H5N8 and approxi-
mately 36% for HPAIV H5N6. While this might suggest a
difference in HPAIV virulence in this population (and per-
haps among related waterbirds), uncertainty in our case
fatality estimates is high and, given the modelling assump-
tions made, we cannot rule out that the case fatality rates
were the same in both outbreaks (electronic supplementary
material, figure S2). The estimates of case fatality rate are
consistent with the observation that between two and four
of the five juvenile birds that tested positive for HPAIV
during the H5N6 outbreak later died. It is therefore possible
that the number of infected birds was simply lower during
the H5N6 outbreak than the H5N8 outbreak—perhaps a
result of partial herd immunity due to the previous exposure
of the population to H5N8.4. Discussion
Although the geographical and temporal spread of H5
HPAIV has been well characterized over large scales [5–8],
detailed information about the dynamics and demographics
of HPAI outbreaks in individual wild bird populations is
rare. While longitudinal surveys of the epidemiology of
LPAIV in wild birds are well established (e.g. [33,34]), the
apparent unpredictability of HPAI outbreaks makes such
studies more challenging for HPAIV. In this study, we pres-
ent data from a wild population of long-lived birds that has
experienced a series of outbreaks of H5 HPAIV, including
the H5N8 and H5N6 epidemics presented here, and the
H5N1 2007/08 event that has been reported in more detail
previously [12]. We show that the timing, duration and dri-
vers of mortality in these outbreaks are strikingly consistent
between years, hinting that HPAIV may be more amenable
for study in the wild than previously thought.The estimated ‘start dates’ of all three outbreaks on the
Fleet Lagoon are unexpectedly similar. This holds true both
if the ‘start date’ is considered to be the first detection of posi-
tive birds, or if it is considered to be the date of the MRCA of
the outbreak clade, obtained using phylogenetic reconstruc-
tion. The similarity in start dates among years is
unexpected given the very complex ecology involved, and
the absence of clear, repeatable trends at larger continental
scales. Because many waterbird species cannot feed if wet-
land habitats freeze, wild bird movement and migration is
known to be influenced by changes in local temperatures,
which can in turn influence the geographical spread of AIV
[35,36]. Autumn and early winter temperatures were higher
in Europe in 2017 compared with 2016, and consequently,
waterbirds generally arrived in the UK later and in lower
numbers in 2016 than in 2017 [37]. Given the inter-annual
variation in European climate and avian movement, it is
therefore surprising that all three outbreaks at the Fleet
Lagoon began at very similar times. However, data from
the Fleet Lagoon suggest that the peak autumn counts of
many different species occurred in the same month of all 3
years (electronic supplementary material, figure S6), so it is
possible that bird immigration to the Fleet Lagoon was less
variable between years than that at other locations. More
detailed GPS tracking of individual migrating and resident
birds at the Fleet Lagoon would help to resolve the effects
of season and temperature on bird movement and density,
which may explain the coincidental timing of the outbreaks
observed here.
For H5N1, H5N8 and H5N6, the MRCA of all outbreak
HA sequences was estimated to exist in mid- to late Novem-
ber of each year (95% HPD credible interval approximately
October–December) [12], which makes it possible that each
HPAIV circulated cryptically for up to ten weeks on the
Fleet Lagoon before the first HPAIV-infected swans were
detected. For several reasons, it seems unlikely that the
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8virus could have circulated among the swans for as long as
ten weeks before mortality manifested itself in the epidemic.
Large numbers of swan faecal or cloacal samples collected at
the site on 24 November 2016 (n ¼ 69) and 3 November 2017
(n ¼ 100) tested negative for AIV RNA by RT-qPCR. Given a
population size of approximately 800 birds, we can be 95%
confident that less than approximately 3.5% of the population
could have been infected with HPAI H5 viruses on these
dates. Experimental studies of H5N1 have demonstrated
that most immunologically naive swans die of H5N1 infec-
tion between 5 and 10 days post-infection [38,39]. Here, we
observe two birds that died 3 and 11 days after H5N6
HPAIV RNA was found in swabs taken from them. Further,
there was an explosive increase in mortality following the
first detected deaths in the H5N8 and H5N8 outbreaks
(figure 1a). It therefore seems highly unlikely that the virus
could have been circulating within the swan population for
longer than a fortnight before increased mortality was
observed. However, the virus could have been introduced
by, and circulated undetected among, other species of water-
birds on the Fleet Lagoon, prior to the subsequent incursion
into the swan population, as was previously suggested for
H5N1 [12].
We cannot determine which species may have originally
brought H5 HPAIV to the Fleet Lagoon. While the swan
population suffered severe mortality that was consistent
with the morbidity observed in experimental challenge
studies [39,40], no significant increase in mortality was
observed for other species. Two Canada geese and a
common pochard were found dead and HPAIV-positive on
the Fleet Lagoon (Branta canadensis, n ¼ 1 during H5N6 and
n ¼ 1 during H5N1; Aythya ferina, n ¼ 1 during H5N6). How-
ever, phylogenetic analysis cannot rule out that these birds
were infected locally [12]. It is possible that the virus was
introduced by a species that can tolerate HPAIV infection
without showing disease symptoms [41]. We inferred that
all H5 HPAIVs entered the Fleet Lagoon at the time of year
when waterbird immigration to the Fleet Lagoon is highest,
as previously noted for H5N1 [12]. Species that migrate
into the Fleet Lagoon during autumn and early winter
(such as the common pochard and other long-distance
migratory species) are therefore more plausible vectors of
the virus than those species that are locally resident (such
as the mute swan or Canada goose) (electronic supplemen-
tary material, figure S7), supporting the results of
phylodynamic analyses conducted at an international scale
[4]. Analysing detailed bird count data from affected sites
in different countries, with better spatio-temporal tracking
of bird movements, may help to determine which species
drive the long-distance movement of HPAIV.
Using daily counts of swans thatwere founddead at the site,
we estimated themean basic reproductive number (R0) for lethal
infection as approximately 2.5 for both outbreaks. This is
slightly higher than R0 values estimated for H5N1 from case
count data (mean R0, 1.6 [42]) and for clade 2.3.4.4 viruses
H5N2 and H5N8 via phylodynamic modelling (mean R0 from
HA gene: 1.6–1.7 [43]). This may be because the Fleet Lagoon
swan population comprises a high proportion of immunologi-
cally naive, juvenile birds among which the virus could be
easily transmitted, or because of the high bird density at the
site that is encouraged by regular, supplementary feeding.
For the first time, we report data on mortality outcomes of
individual wild birds, whose serological status had beenobserved immediately prior to natural exposure to HPAIV.
Although several birds that died of HPAIV were seropositive
for previous AIV infection two months prior to the HPAIV
outbreak, none of these birds had been previously infected
with an H5 virus. This finding is not appropriate for statistical
testing owing to the low sample sizes. However, it is certainly
consistent with mounting evidence from experimental chal-
lenge studies, and from observational data on LPAIV, that
birds are more protected against infection by a novel AIV if
they were previously infected by a virus of the same subtype
than by a virus of a different subtype [11,44–48].
Whether age correlates with protection against HPAIV is
difficult to study in wild bird populations, as population age
structures are rarely known and HPAIV infection is typically
rare. Previous exposure to certain LPAIVs can reduce mor-
bidity upon challenge with H5 HPAIV [11,40,44,49]. As
birds age, they are increasingly likely to gain serological
responses to AIV, including to an increasingly broad range
of different subtypes [50–60]. This immunological pattern
could lead to older birds having a lower risk of death upon
HPAIV infection. Among swans on the Fleet Lagoon, we
found that birds that were greater than 1 year old at the
time of infection with HPAIV were significantly less likely
to die than younger birds during all three outbreaks. In
addition, testing of live birds during the peak of the H5N6
outbreak in 2017/18 showed that older birds were eight
times less likely to have the qPCR-detectable virus than
younger birds, although this difference was not significant.
Swan age was also closely correlated with immunological
responses against AIV NP and also against H5 HA. Despite
suggestions that slight differences in age (weeks to months)
may modulate mortality risk upon HPAIV exposure, even
in the absence of differences in immunological status
[61,62], we found no evidence of this among birds on the
Fleet Lagoon and our data indicate that immunological
status is the key driver of mortality risk in this population.
We found no evidence for seasonal differences in AIV
seroprevalence in the swans on the Fleet Lagoon, in agree-
ment with our previous conclusion that antibodies to AIV
are likely to be long lasting in swans [63]. Immunologically
naive birds are therefore mainly introduced into the popu-
lation only via hatching and not via sero-reversion. It is
possible that age-related patterns of mortality are less
clear in other avian species, for example, if adult birds
sero-revert more frequently, rendering less distinct the
immunological profiles of adults and juveniles [55,64].
The prevalence of immunological responses to a virus in a
population is a critical determinant of whether the virus
can be maintained in the absence of antigenic adaptation.
The rate of introduction of immunologically naive birds
into bird populations, mediated by differences in lifespan
and the duration of antibody responses, should be investi-
gated in more detail for a wider number of species in
order to better understand the risk of H5 HPAIV becoming
enzootic in wild birds.
Decades of research into human pathogens has proven
the importance of cohort studies and individual-level demo-
graphic data for understanding infectious disease
epidemiology. Despite this, individual-level data are almost
never available for outbreaks in wild animals or plants, and
the unit of study is instead often a larger group (e.g. flock,
herd or farm). Individual-level studies that generate high-
quality data are often impractical or too expensive to
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9implement in the wild. Here, we were able to exploit bird
demographic data that were collected for the purpose of
longitudinal ecological research, in order to investigate the
demographic context of virus transmission in wild animals.
This approach has potential applications to other emerging out-
breaks and could be facilitated by close collaboration between
ecologists, virologists and epidemiologists at high-risk sites.
Such analyses have the potential to generate epidemiological
information for wild animal and plant populations that is of
the same quality as that achievable by prospective cohort
studies of human populations.
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